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stakeholders typically exhibit a “fairness bias”, i.e., they tend, consciously or not, to interpret and 
apply fairness principles in a self-serving manner, whereas the views of spectators, or impartial 
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potentially important policy implications through the overall social objective function. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A critical issue faced by policy makers across the world is how to distribute the costs and 
benefits of policies designed to address environmental problems, whether dealing with 
automobile emissions, water pollution, toxic substances, solid waste or global climate change. 
Whereas fairness concerns are frequently discussed in many different public policy areas, they 
appear to occupy a particularly prominent place in environmental issues. In fact, environmental 
policies, such as green taxes, fuel economy standards and tradable emissions permits, differ 
dramatically in the distribution of their costs and benefits. 
 
In this paper, we conceive of fairness in rather broad terms as distributive justice, i.e., 
distributive preferences as distinct from self-interest and other social preferences, such as 
altruism, reciprocity and honesty. We focus on the contextual factors and the rules, including 
accountability, efficiency, need and equality, that guide those preferences. Moreover, we note 
that solutions to real environmental problems are often related to the kind of justice concerns we 
address here. 
 
Although environmental economics, as well as economics more generally, is largely based on the 
normative criterion of economic efficiency, it is clear that many people have strong opinions 
about the perceived fairness of different environmental policies, including policies related to . 
climate change and to the implementation and design of tradable permit systems. These opinions 
are reflected in the political debate, where fairness arguments are clearly much more prominent 
than in the environmental economics literature. Thus, although fairness is not a unique concern 
to environmental issues, it is a prominent theme in real world discussions in this area, even if it 
has been relatively neglected in the environmental economics literature. 
 
Why, then, do economists not integrate fairness more frequently into their models?  There are (at 
least) three reasons:  
1. Such concerns are often seen as highly subjective and amorphous, i.e., they are not 
(sufficiently) structured to be productively incorporated into such models. 
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2. They are invoked chiefly in order to benefit the agent employing them, i.e. they are 
consciously or subconsciously chosen for self-interested reasons. 
3. They complicate the models and make the analysis less tractable. 
 
We think there is merit in these arguments but argue that each of these concerns can be 
satisfactory addressed. First, we certainly do not deny that there are subjective elements in 
people’s fairness perceptions. Nevertheless, even these subjective views obey rules that vary 
predictably across contexts. Second, it is clear that people often exhibit what we will refer to as a 
fairness bias, that is, they construe fairness in self-interested ways. Stakeholders are frequently 
focused on the fairness of policies from a biased perspective, and proponents and even opponents 
of environmental measures often appeal to such arguments, e.g., the latter sometimes claim that 
gasoline taxes would harm the poor. Thus, even when self-interest insinuates itself into these 
deliberations, the arguments are often seemingly framed around a shared set of fairness 
principles (e.g., Lange, et al., 2008). Moreover, these views can also be observed empirically 
under conditions of impartiality and reveal considerable consensus under such conditions. Third, 
as with all generalizations, it follows that fairness considerations do add a layer of complexity to 
formal models. But we maintain that the costs of incorporating fairness concerns into the 
analysis in terms of greater complexity are often outweighed by the benefits, which include 
improved empirical predictive power, richer descriptive theories, and greater policy relevance. 
We also believe that environmental economics would have greater influence on the actual 
environmental policy if fairness considerations were to be taken more seriously. 
 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses different means for 
measuring fairness concerns with particular attention to the role of fairness biases. Section 3 
discusses different fairness rules that people apply and the associated empirical evidence, 
whereas Section 4 discusses further interpretive issues, such as how people handle situations 
involving tradeoffs between different fairness principles and context dependencies. Section 5 
specifically discusses implications for environmental economics, including normative analysis. 
For example, one position is that fairness principles should inform the overarching goals of 
environmental policy, if one takes some version of the justice values of real people as relevant to 
normative foundations (e.g., Konow, 2003). Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Can Fairness Concerns be Measured, and, If So, How? 
 
The fact that fairness judgments require various interpretative decisions introduces the possibility 
of arriving at very different conclusions. This means that there is rarely unanimity in views of 
justice, even though impartial judges often exhibit a high degree of consensus. The situation with 
stakeholders, however, is considerably more difficult, often with polarized views and sometimes 
even modest levels of consensus a remote ideal. Stakeholders frequently advocate and pursue 
goals that favor their material interests but that depart from the outcomes preferred, on average, 
by impartial spectators. We refer to this discrepancy between spectator and stakeholder views as 
a “fairness bias.” This bias can be decomposed into at least two parts. 
 
First, there is a “self-centered bias,” which is that part of the discrepancy that is acknowledged 
by the stakeholder, at least to him- or herself. For example, a polluter seeking to avoid regulation 
might recognize its efforts as serving primarily to protect its own profits, even if it does not cite 
that fact in making its case to regulators. Arguments motivated by this bias might or might not 
involve fairness, but, if they do, those people advancing them do not actually believe the 
arguments are legitimate but instead might simply be advancing them to manipulate and exploit 
the fairness beliefs of others. Second, there is a “self-serving bias,” which involves a distortion of 
the agent’s own beliefs about what is fair in the direction of his or her material interests. That is, 
the self-serving bias is due to self-deception about what is fair. This idea can be found in 
cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Festinger, 1957), which states that, when people are faced with 
opposing goals, they can relieve the resulting disutility by altering their beliefs. For example, if 
the executive leadership of a firm faces a conflict between maximizing profits and bearing their 
fair share of the costs of reducing emissions, they are likely to underestimate their fair share of 
abatement costs relative to the view third parties hold. 
 
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) report the results of a series of studies with their collaborators 
that investigate self-serving bias in the laboratory and the field. In particular, they find that this 
bias is significantly correlated with bargaining impasse, that this relationship is causal, and that it 
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affects behavior not only in the laboratory but also has important repercussions in real world 
bargaining situations with high stakes, e.g., in teacher contract negotiations. In their experimental 
studies, subjects bargained within a contextually rich framework, a novel departure from the 
minimalist scenarios of most economics experiments. Research in psychology indicates that such 
richness feeds self-serving bias: Dunning et al. (1989), for example, find that self-serving 
evaluations increase with the number of criteria at one’s disposal. This suggests that the 
numerous interpretative decisions inherent to most fairness evaluations facilitate this bias. But 
the self-serving bias can manifest itself even in relatively sterile contexts. For example, the 
fairness bias is decomposed in a simple dictator experiment in Konow (2000). Based on actual 
behavior in economic experiments, around 60% of the overall bias in dictator decisions can be 
attributed to self-serving bias, whereas about 40% is due to unadulterated self-interest (i.e., the 
self-centered bias). Such subconscious biases can be expected frequently in environmental 
contexts, which are often characterized by countless specifics and informational asymmetries. In 
addition, these same properties can lead to conscious strategic manipulation of fairness concepts. 
For example, stakeholders, such as polluting firms, frequently possess better information about 
their costs of complying with environmental objectives than, say, their competitors or 
government regulators, and one might expect the former to exaggerate these costs and the latter 
to discount them. 
 
Lange, Löschel, Vogt and Ziegler (2008) study fairness bias in international climate policy. They 
report a survey of almost two hundred individuals actually involved in negotiating climate policy 
across three continents. Specifically, respondents state their views of the fairness of four rules 
informed by different interpretations of the fair distribution of obligations to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. They find that individuals in different geographical regions generally favor rules 
that impose lower costs on their region and higher costs, by implication, on those in other 
regions, apparently in support of a fairness bias. The data in this study do not allow a 
decomposition of this bias, but one piece of evidence is suggestive of some role for self-serving 
bias: the respondents tended to view their own preference of rules as less self-interested than the 
preferences of others. The latter fact is consistent with a large literature suggesting that most 
people seem to consider themselves as “better” than the average person in dimensions such as 
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social responsibility. For example, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2009) found that people on 
average think that others vote more for selfish reasons than they do themselves. 
 
To the extent stakeholders impacted by environmental policy are subject to a self-serving bias, 
the results from fairness research are not auspicious. In particular, the stakes in real world 
environmental problems are much higher than in an economics experiment. Yet even in 
experiments it is quite difficult to dislodge this bias. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) report 
various interventions to mediate or purge the self-serving bias among subjects, mostly to little 
effect. Informing subjects of the bias had no effect, nor did writing an essay arguing the 
opponent’s case, although informing subjects of the bias combined with having them list 
weaknesses in their own case did significantly reduce the bias. The study of Oberholzer-Gee, 
Bohnet and Frey (1997) suggests that, ultimately, solutions to such conflicts might reside in 
lessons from procedural justice. They survey a sample of the general Swiss population on their 
views of the fairness of different procedures for the siting of hazardous waste facilities, viz., 
waste from nuclear power plants, and also report facts about the actual siting of such a facility. 
They find strong support for processes that respect impartiality, information, consent and 
fairness, as well as a greater willingness for people to accept a burden under such conditions. 
 
Given the frequent evidence of fairness biases one may wonder whether fairness perceptions are 
inherently subjective, and whether it is at all meaningful to talk about objective or impartial 
measures of fairness? Yet, we argue that it is both meaningful and possible to analyze measures 
of fairness objectively. We maintain, however, that such attempts should eliminate, or at least 
minimize, the direct material stakes of the subject whose fairness preferences are measured in 
order to reduce fairness biases. There are primarily two kinds of broad measures for doing so: 1) 
survey studies where subjects are asked to state which of different alternatives is the fairest one 
(e.g. Konow, 1996), and 2) experimental studies with real monetary incentives where the 
subjects act as third party decision-makers who choose allocations for other subjects, implying 
that their decision will have real effects for the other subjects but not for themselves (e.g. 
Konow, 2000). 
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3. Fairness Rules 
 
Distributive justice, which we use here interchangeably with fairness, concerns moral 
preferences over the distribution of social and economic benefits and burdens among a group of 
individuals. As a moral preference, it is distinct from self-interest. Viewed as distributive 
preferences, justice also differs from altruism, which in economics typically characterizes an 
unconditional preference, such as pure altruism or warm glow (see Andreoni, 1990). Instead, 
justice takes a more specific form and might involve some general relationship between 
preferred outcomes and other factors such as desert, endowments, productivity, need or effort. 
As behavioral economics has developed over almost three decades, fairness concerns have 
figured prominently throughout, for example, fairness has frequently been suspected in the 
results of experimental bargaining games beginning with Güth et al. (1982). But it is only 
relatively recently that fairness has been analyzed as a possible force in environmental 
economics, e.g., Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) and Lange and Vogt (2003). Numerous 
experimental and field studies indicate that such preferences have frequent and quantitatively 
large impacts on economic behavior. Nevertheless, despite certain patterns, including the 
frequent incidence of equal splits in bargaining experiments, the findings defy explanation 
according to a single rule or principle. In this paper, we examine four rules that we believe 
characterize actualized distributive preferences: accountability, efficiency, need and equality. 
 
3.1. The Accountability Principle 
 
The first rule we discuss is a relative concept of fairness, i.e., it pertains to the allocation of a 
benefit or burden of a given size among a set of persons. The accountability principle states that 
a person’s allocation should be in proportion to the relevant variables he/she controls, but this 
rule does not hold the person accountable for other differences (Konow, 1996). For example, if 
worker A is twice as productive as worker B, A should earn twice as much as B, if the 
productivity difference is due to A working more hours or exerting greater effort. But they 
should earn the same, if the productivity difference is due entirely to factors they do not control, 
such as innate ability or differing work conditions. Thus, accountability integrates two concepts: 
proportionality and responsibility. 
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 Justice as proportionality is often referred to as equity theory in psychology, sociology and 
political science. Equity theory states that individuals are motivated to establish or maintain 
proportionality of agents’ inputs (e.g., their contributions to production) to the outputs they 
receive (e.g., their earnings), although, as usually formulated, equity theory does not restrict the 
variables that may count as inputs. Empirical studies substantiate the economic importance of 
proportionality, e.g., Gächter and Riedl (2005), Güth (1994), and Selten (1978). Specifically, 
proportionality emerges as a quite robust finding when impartial preferences are elicited. In 
Gächter and Riedl (2006), survey participants respond that the fairest division of earnings in a 
vignette is in proportion to historical performance. In the dictator experiments of Konow (2000) 
and Konow, Saijo and Akai (2009), third parties allocate proportionately to the individual 
performance of other subjects in a task. 
 
The other part of accountability is responsibility, which is sometimes associated with the concept 
of just deserts, e.g., Nozick (1974), and is often considered central to normative theories of fair 
reward, e.g., Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996), Capellen and Tungodden (2003) and Roemer (1998). 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Fong (2001) find that popular support for income 
redistribution is strongly related the perceived control of recipients over their circumstances. The 
accountability principle merges proportionality and responsibility: fair outputs are proportional 
to inputs agents’ control. This principle has been corroborated in experiments: in the 
aforementioned dictator study of Konow (2000), third parties allocate proportionally, when 
productivity is chosen, but equally, when productivity is due solely to arbitrary differences 
between subjects. The accountability principle is also related to important work in normative 
ethics, e.g., Capellen and Tungodden (2009), which potentially informs policy. In the context of 
environmental policy, it implies, for example, that those who reduce emissions should benefit 
proportionately or, conversely, that polluter costs be proportionate to their emissions. Thus, even 
if the conditions of the Coase Theorem apply and pollution abatement can be as efficiently 
achieved by assigning property rights to emitters as to the parties affected by the externality, this 
principle suggests that people are not neutral with respect to the implied distribution of burdens. 
This is consistent with the survey results in Konow (1996) showing that, even when it is 
considerably more expensive for the emitter to eliminate the pollution, 84% of 219 respondents 
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find it unfair when the court assigns property rights to the emitter, whereas 80% of 240 
respondents find it fair when the court assigns these rights to the affected party. 
 
In terms of burden sharing for global carbon emission reduction, this seems to imply that every 
person in the world should have an equal initial right to pollute, since it is hard to argue that 
some individuals have earned the right to pollute more than others. Although such a global 
distribution of emissions would, of course, imply large inefficiencies, it is, in principle, 
straightforward to combine it with a market-based instrument that deals with the efficiency 
aspects. One possibility, for instance, is a global system of tradable permits, where the initial 
allocation is proportional to the population size in each country. Alternatively, a system with 
very similar distributional implications is a global tax on emissions, whereby the revenues are 
distributed back in proportion to population size.1 Of course, policies that seem ethically 
appealing (e.g. Kverndokk, 1995) are not necessarily politically feasible, and there are also 
further practical hurdles, such as widespread political corruption in many poor countries, which 
complicates the picture.  
 
3.2. The Efficiency Principle 
 
The efficiency principle simply calls for maximizing total surplus. In economics, fairness and 
efficiency are often considered to be at odds, and much discussion concerns the equity-efficiency 
trade-off. To be sure, the two can conflict, as with a lump sum tax that impacts living standards 
of low income individuals disproportionately. However, they need not necessarily conflict, for 
example if pollution permits are allocated so as to favor developing economies as mentioned 
above. Moreover, survey evidence shows that views of fairness encompass not only equity (i.e., 
accountability) but also efficiency; indeed, fair allocations reflect trade-offs between competing 
distributive rules (see Konow, 2001). Experimental studies corroborate the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity; see e.g. Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Fehr, Naef and Schmidt (2006) 
and Stahl and Haruvy (2009). In fact, many subjects exhibit a remarkable willingness to sacrifice 
personal earnings in order to increase the total, e.g., in the dictator games reported in Andreoni 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, one could even argue that poorer countries should have the right to emit more than the richer 
countries in the future, in order to compensate for their lower emissions in the past. 
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and Miller (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002). 
 
The importance of efficiency among distributive preferences is good news for environmental 
economics, most of which has, to date, stressed efficiency as the normative goal of policy.2 
Indeed, the news only seems to get better, when one considers recent experimental evidence 
suggesting that surplus maximization also affects the willingness to cooperate. In a voluntary 
contribution game, Oxoby (2006) allows subjects to constrain the choices of others to more 
efficient outcomes and finds that, if they can dictate cooperation by others, subjects then 
voluntarily choose themselves to contribute rather than to free-ride. Nevertheless, collectively, 
the evidence suggests that efficiency does not exhaust the set of preferences relevant to 
cooperation. Stahl and Haruvy (2009) argue that the results of their extensive-form games are 
best reconciled with a behavioral model that incorporates self-interest, efficiency and inequality 
aversion.  
 
 
3.3. The Need Principle 
 
The need principle of distributive justice requires the satisfaction of the basic needs of all 
individuals. Similar to the efficiency principle, it is an absolute standard, but it pertains to 
minimum allocations to individuals as opposed to maximization of aggregate allocations. Survey 
results indicate that people associate fairness with the satisfaction of basic needs, but when needs 
satisfaction conflicts with accountability or efficiency, there is a trade-off among these goals 
(e.g., Konow, 2001). Some dictator experiments are suggestive of a concern for need. Eckel and 
Grossman (1996) find that student dictators are less generous toward fellow students than toward 
the presumably more needy recipients of their donations to the American Red Cross. Crumpler 
and Grossman (2008) present subjects with a choice of charities, and dictators seem to choose 
most frequently ones serving those whose basic needs or health is threatened. The results of 
Konow (2009b) provide stronger support for a concern for basic needs: in one treatment, 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, as discussed further in Section 5.3, it is possible that some people value efficiency without 
considering it to be an element of fairness.  
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dictators donate to one of two charities that explicitly provide for basic needs and, in other 
treatments, to fellow students. Transfers in the former significantly exceed those in the latter and 
are the largest of any laboratory dictator study (the modal gift was the dictator’s entire 
endowment). Moreover, in post-experimental questionnaires, roughly two-thirds of the more 
generous dictators explain their motivation in terms of a concern for the needs of recipients. 
Interestingly, many of the more selfish dictators in this study also explain their allocations in 
terms of need but by appeal to their own needs. 
 
Despite the prominent place given to needs in the early days of economics, e.g., by Malthus 
(1798) and George (1879), it occupies a considerably less visible position in most modern 
economics, excepting, to some degree, in development economics. In particular, most economics 
experiments and social preference models that have accompanied them do not consider need 
among the motivations. Perhaps this is related to the fact that most of this research has been 
conducted in the developed world, where such concerns are not salient in the populations usually 
studied. Nevertheless, with an estimated 40% of the world’s population living on less than $2 per 
day (World Bank Development Indicators, 2005), need certainly cannot be ignored in an 
international analysis of justice. In fact, discussions about the fairness of the burden of climate 
change policy often centers on differences between developed countries and those that have to 
cope with high rates of poverty. In a survey of agents involved in negotiations over climate 
change policy, Lange et al. (2008) find strong support for the “ability to pay” rule that favors less 
developed countries by assigning responsibility for abatement costs based on GDP. 
 
3.4 The Equality Norm 
 
Probably the most striking stylized fact of experimental studies involving social preferences is 
the high incidence of equal splits. A frequent, and often the modal, decision is one that creates 
equal earnings in designs as varied as the dictator game, ultimatum game, and trust game. Most 
of the major theories of social preferences that have been developed to account for experimental 
results incorporate equality as an argument, including Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness 
and Rabin (2002), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), although see also Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad 
(2007) for one exception. It is usually the case that results of public good experiments are also 
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characterized by equality, but of a different kind, viz., equal contributions. Buckley and Croson 
(2006) and Cherry, Kroll and Shogren (2005), for example, conduct linear public good 
experiments with endowment heterogeneity. To equalize net earnings, those subjects with high 
endowments should contribute more than those with low endowments. But, instead, there is a 
pronounced tendency in these studies for subjects to match absolute contributions irrespective of 
endowments or net earnings. Indeed, such matching of transfers is a stylized fact of many 
experiments involving cooperation, including Charness, Fréchette and Qin (2007), Croson, Fatas 
and Neugebauer (2005) and Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001). These two goals (equalizing 
earnings vs. equalizing contributions) have very different implications for the distribution of the 
costs and benefits of environmental policy.  
 
We believe these conflicting goals can be better understood by distinguishing impartial fairness 
preferences from the potentially biased views of stakeholders. The former are important as 
guides to normative economics and economic policy and, to the extent they are shared by 
stakeholders, to descriptive analysis of fairness. The latter are crucial to understanding and 
predicting behavior in many real world situations in which self-interest is implicated but agents 
might also have to factor in their distinct fairness preferences from those of spectators. Let us 
consider and clarify these two perspectives in turn. 
 
Evidence on impartial preferences comes from survey studies of fairness and from experimental 
studies employing third party decision-makers who choose allocations for other subjects. Based 
on these, Konow (2003) concludes that equality is not a principle of justice, i.e., a general 
distributive rule endorsed by impartial third parties. The argument is that equality does often 
emerge for a variety of reasons, but not because of a general, impartial preference for it. One 
reason for equality is that it is sometimes a special case of a general principle that otherwise 
produces inequality. For example, equality is a special case of accountability, if the contributions 
individuals control are equal, of efficiency, if equal rewards maximize the total, and of need, if 
the resources needed to satisfy basic needs are the same across individuals. Often, information 
about differences that are relevant to general principles is unavailable or unreliable. In such 
cases, people usually make the ceteris paribus assumption about such differences and favor 
equality by default. A corollary of this last statement is that, when information relevant to other 
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principles becomes available, people will abandon equality in favor of those principles. This is 
consistent with the survey results on fairness attitudes in Konow (2001) and with the allocation 
decisions of experimental subjects who reason impartially in Herne and Mård (2006). The ceteris 
paribus assumption is a plausible explanation for the prominence of equal splits in many 
economics experiments: in order to focus on a particular question or to avoid inadvertent cues, 
many of these studies have a very lean design, but then they often lack the contextual elements or 
means for subjects to apply principles like accountability, efficiency or need. When the 
information and opportunities exist to act on these principles, subjects typically depart from 
equality, as seen for the sake of efficiency in Andreoni and Miller (2001), for accountability in 
Gächter and Riedl (2006), and for need in Konow (2009b). 
 
Thus, the evidence casts doubt on equality as a principle of justice, i.e., a general rule endorsed 
from an impartial or impersonal perspective. Nevertheless, it is clear that equality is frequently 
employed by stakeholders in personal (as opposed to impartial) relationships, such as with the 
treatment of co-workers, duties among family members, earnings of counterparts in bargaining 
experiments, or sharing of a dinner bill among friends. Equality is, therefore, a distributive rule 
but one of a different kind, which is why we refer to the equality norm instead of the equality 
principle. As used here, norm connotes a moral rule distinct to personal relationships, whereas 
principle denotes a general and impartial rule. A principle might also be valued, of course, in 
personal relationships, e.g., co-workers might be motivated not only by equality but also by 
accountability, but a norm is relevant only in personal contexts. This typology is consistent with 
the results of Konow, Saijo and Akai (2009). Their dictator study involves allocations by third 
parties, or impartial spectators, as well as by standard dictators, or stakeholders, who vary across 
treatments in how personal their relationships are to their paired recipients. Spectators allocate 
strictly according to accountability, whereas stakeholders shift toward equality, and the shift is 
greater, the more personal their relationship to recipients. These patterns are remarkably robust 
with respect to a wide range of variables, including nationality (US or Japanese), culture, race, 
income and gender. 
 
Contributors to a public good are also in a personal relationship: even if they are anonymous, 
they are matched with other subjects and share earnings in a manner that depends on their 
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individual decisions. Public good experiments often produce marked patterns of equality, but this 
typically takes the form of a tendency to equalize absolute contributions as in Croson (2007). 
Cherry, Kroll and Shogren (2005) find a similar tendency: high endowment subjects do not 
contribute proportionately more than low endowment subjects, but the former do contribute 
significantly more in absolute terms, suggesting that there is an attempt, on average, partially to 
offset differences in endowments. These results relate easily to debates that occur over the 
fairness of environmental policies. For instance, negotiations about global warming often revolve 
around the fairness of rules that require equal contributions, such as the egalitarian rule, versus 
those that tend to equalize incomes after the costs of abatement, such as the ability to pay rule. 
 
 
4. Tradeoffs and Interpretive Issues 
 
The fairness rules described in the previous section are conceptually quite simple, so it seems 
that applying them should be relatively straightforward. Nevertheless, the frequency and ferocity 
of debates over fairness make it obvious that their application is anything but straightforward. 
 
A little reflection reveals, however, that, even if there were complete agreement on and clarity 
about the rules of justice, people would not be able to judge the fairness of allocations without 
specification of additional variables. What is required is a series of interpretative decisions about 
contextual factors. First, what is the relative importance of each rule, when the pursuit of one 
rule conflicts with the satisfaction of another? For instance, how does one balance the efficiency 
of reducing toxic industrial waste with the potential loss of employment? Indeed, the 
experimental literature is replete with examples of heterogeneity of types according to their 
social preferences or their willingness to act on them. Andreoni and Miller (2002), for example, 
report that about 47% of their dictators are selfish, 30% want equality and 23% prefer efficiency. 
Studies of cooperation in public good games and other social dilemmas similarly suggest that 
people fall into different categories, including defectors, conditional cooperators and 
unconditional cooperators (see Chaudhuri, 2009). Agents also differ in their motives, which can 
include, among others, altruism and warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), or reciprocity and conformity 
(Alpizar, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008). 
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 Even if there is agreement on the first question about how to weigh fairness rules, however, the 
second set of questions reveals even deeper interpretative issues. Specifically, which people and 
what variables should be included when evaluating fairness? This question can be contentious, 
even if one is trying to apply only a single rule. For example, when attempting to determine fair 
country requirements for the reduction of greenhouse gases according to the accountability 
principle, should nations with historically higher emissions bear greater costs given that their 
situation resulted from their choices of inefficient vehicles and dirty technologies, or should their 
burden be moderated by claims that their higher emissions are partially due to factors outside 
their control, such as greater travel distances or an outdated infrastructure that is expensive to 
renovate? As Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007) demonstrate in their dictator 
game study, people sometimes arrive at very different conclusions about what variables are 
relevant when assigning responsibility. The other question is which people to include when 
considering the repercussions for fairness of any policies. For example, should one consider the 
effects of a sulfur dioxide tradeable permits program only on those directly affected, or should 
one adopt a broader perspective and also consider its effects on their incomes relative to those of 
others in the region, country or world? With global climate change, the choice seems more 
obvious, at least for normative matters, that one should include peoples of all countries affected. 
But then does one also try generally to tackle broader questions of international inequities in 
income? The evidence on stakeholder behavior suggests people tend to choose a narrower, local 
view. Ruffle and Sosis (2004), for example, find significant in-group-out-group bias in a field 
experiment on cooperation among kibbutz members and city dwellers. 
 
Nevertheless, a considerable volume of survey and experimental research suggests that impartial 
judges often achieve a fairly high of agreement about what is fair, even if stakeholders more 
frequently disagree (see Konow, 2003, for examples, including for the following conclusions). 
What seems to guide stakeholder views and often create spectator consensus are the particulars 
provided by the context. First, people typically work with the available information in evaluating 
the relative importance of fairness rules. Thus, for example, if people in a developed country are 
presented with the question of how to divide a given salary pool between two workers who have 
chosen to work different hours, they will apply accountability and favor proportionality, ignoring 
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both efficiency, since the pool is fixed, and need, since the basic needs of workers in developed 
countries are not typically endangered. Similarly, as previously mentioned, student subjects in 
dictator experiments are more generous toward charities, responding to the need of their 
beneficiaries, than toward fellow students, where the equality norm usually applies and requires 
only equal splits. Second, impartial judges usually exhibit a high degree of agreement about the 
choice of variables and people relevant to fairness evaluation. Again context provides most 
direction on and, consequently, answers to these questions. For example, survey respondents 
view a CEO’s high salary as fair, when compared to other similarly paid executives, but as 
unfair, when compared to the much lower compensation to workers. As this last example 
illustrates, however, not all information is created equal, and judgments can be sensitive to 
framing effects. This is useful to know for descriptive analyses of fairness but perhaps troubling 
for prescriptive work on justice. Nevertheless, even the latter concern seems less serious in light 
of evidence that spectators can identify morally relevant information and, when they do, arrive at 
a consensus about fair allocations (Konow, 2009a). 
 
 
5. Fairness Concerns and Environmental Policy 
 
The studies cited above provide ample support for the claim that people care about fairness. But 
does this fact have any implication for environmental policy and for how we should 
systematically analyze environmental problems? We answer these questions in the affirmative 
for a variety of reasons. 
 
5.1 Cooperation possibilities and fairness concerns 
 
The climate can be seen as a global public good, since we can all benefit from it, but we cannot 
exclude others from also benefiting. This is, of course, also the core of the problem, since what is 
rational for a single country in isolation is globally suboptimal. If each country has to pay for its 
own abatement costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, while all countries now and in the 
future share the benefits, there is clearly room for free-riding, such that each country continues to 
emit more than what is globally optimal. In order to prevent free-riding, we need agreements on 
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some kind of a cooperative solution, e.g., in terms of coalitions. There is a relatively large 
theoretical literature on negotiations related to transnational pollution, e.g., Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1998) and Asheim et al. (2006), but almost all of this literature assumes that each 
negotiating country cares solely about its own material payoff (cf. Barrett, 2005). Some of this 
literature concerns repeated games, i.e., negotiations occur not once, but rather multiple times, 
and asymmetries between, negotiating parties, i.e., they take account of the fact that some 
countries are much larger and more powerful than others. Other approaches, so-called 
differential games, deal both with strategic interaction and dynamic optimisation simultaneously. 
Moreover, parts of the literature allow for collusion, i.e., the possibility that some countries 
cooperate with one another against other countries. 
 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) provide the standard approach to studying 
coalition formation in the climate context. They use a two-period non-cooperative framework in 
which countries first decide whether or not to join a coalition. Those who join will then behave 
cooperatively with one another in a second stage. Both the coalition (as an entity) and the 
remaining countries choose their emission levels non-cooperatively. As shown by Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994, 1997), the resulting coalition size tends to be rather small. 
 
Lange and Vogt (2003), on the other hand, show that, when countries care not only about their 
own absolute payoffs but also about fairness, the coalition size tends to be larger, and even the 
grand coalition (that includes all countries) can be stable. In contrast to Lange and Vogt (2003) 
who employ a symmetric model, Lange (2006) considers the situation with asymmetries, in 
which case it is no longer obvious that fairness concerns increase the coalition size. 
 
The above examples show that fairness concerns can, in principle, have significant implications 
for negotiating parties, providing a rationale for incorporating such concerns into formal 
environmental economics models. However, the major entities making and attempting to 
influence environmental policy are often large organizations, such as governments and 
corporations, rather than the individuals whose decisions often form the basis for the behavioral 
findings reported previously. That individuals seem to care about fairness does not, of course, 
imply that the Board of Directors of Exxon and Archer Daniels Midland or the leaders of 
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industrial nations are similarly motivated. Indeed, the fact that decisions about environmental 
policy are often made by large groups does not seem to bode well for fairness and for 
international cooperation on the environment, given evidence that groups tend to act in a more 
selfish way than individuals (e.g., Luhan, Kocher and Sutter, 2009). Thus, one might expect 
resistance to environmental initiatives from countries and large corporations. On the other hand, 
groups, in the end, consist of individuals, who bring their own values into these interactions, as 
the aforementioned results of Lange et al. (2008) suggest.  
 
Moreover, these organizations are often constrained by the values of others, even if they do not 
place great value on fairness themselves. Governments (even undemocratic ones) are usually 
subject, to some degree, to the views and passions of their constituents, and fairness likely plays 
a significant role in the motives of the latter. Given the negligible instrumental value of voting 
relative to its cost, Brennan and Hamlin (1998) conclude that an important reason people vote in 
the first place is for expressive purposes. This claim finds support in field and experimental 
studies, e.g., see Sobel and Wagner (2004) and Tyran (2004), respectively. The putative 
importance of this expressive motive suggests that voting is a reflection less of a concern for 
material payoffs than of values, such as fairness. Similarly, corporations must, of course, pay 
attention to their potential customers, who can engage in boycotts and appeal to state 
intervention, as evidenced by their public relations campaigns and by adjustments of business 
practices in response to expressed or expected public reactions. 
 
Thus, although self-interest will certainly influence group behavior, as it does individual 
behavior, we can also expect fairness to play a role. Moreover, the project of determining the 
influence of fairness on environmental issues is not aimed at proving that fairness always 
dominates such issues, but rather at understanding better its distinctive and often significant role, 
both for descriptive as well as prescriptive analysis. 
 
5.2 Environmental valuation and fairness 
 
In survey-based environmental valuation investigations, such as contingent valuation studies, 
people are implicitly or explicitly asked to value an environmental improvement, or the 
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avoidance of an environmental damage, in terms of their maximum willingness to pay (or WTP). 
It is normally assumed that these values reflect their preferences in a manner that corresponds to 
their individual well-being. There is also evidence, however, from “think-aloud” methodology 
that the results of environmental valuation studies appear to be influenced by what people 
believe their fair share of the costs associated with an improvement would be (Schkade and 
Payne, 1994). 
 
Note that this motive is distinct from other non-selfish motives, such as those based on non-
paternalistic or paternalistic altruism, cf. McConnel (1997) and Johansson-Stenman (2000). 
Although fairness-based WTP statements might provide the authorities with some valuable 
information in terms of priorities (see Section 5.3 below), it does not make sense to incorporate 
such responses uncritically into a conventional cost-benefit analysis as if they reflected the 
respondents’ true values in terms of their well-being. There are at least two reasons for prudence 
in this regard: first, there are questions about the contingent valuation method that have yet to be 
answered, and, second, there are questions about interpreting preferences (even fairness 
preferences) as well-being, which we will address in the following sub-section. 
 
On the other hand, these facts do not rule out the usefulness of such studies for purposes of 
measuring people’s preferences over the distributive consequences of solutions to environmental 
problems, such as to the problem of climate change. For example, Cai, Cameron and Gerdes 
(2008) provide a carefully executed web-based contingent valuation study of a hypothetical 
referendum type that measures willingness to pay for global warming mitigation. They found 
that people are typically willing to pay more, when the payment vehicle implies that larger cost 
shares are borne by parties deemed to bear a greater responsibility for mitigation, and when 
respondents believe that the effects of climate change might be borne disproportionately by the 
world’s poor. These results are, of course, entirely consistent with the accountability and need 
principles discussed above. Nevertheless, as useful as stated preference methods may be, it is 
important to keep in mind that, when it comes to welfare analysis, it is inappropriate to equate 
people’s willingness to pay with individual measures of welfare change.3 
                                                 
3 At least, this caveat applies, if one means by ‘welfare change’ changes in actual or expected well-being; if ‘welfare 
change’ means something else, that must be specified differently. 
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 5.3 The social objective 
 
Let us suppose that people have fairness preferences as outlined above. Does that mean that the 
social objective function in economic analysis should change accordingly? We argue against the 
a priori imposition of some social objective, including that of the scientist. Thus, economists 
should be able to analyze normative problems based on an ethical foundation (e.g. some version 
of utilitarianism) that the economist does not share. Hence, in our view it makes perfect sense to 
conclude that based on the ethical assumption A, behavioral assumptions B, and market 
equilibrium assumption C, that conclusion D follows, even if the economist undertaking the 
analysis does not share the views underlying the ethical assumption A. Yet, in practice we often 
have to make some underlying normative assumptions, and we find it different to defend the a 
priori exclusion of fairness considerations in normative analysis. How incorporating fairness 
considerations affects the normative analysis depends on at least two broad considerations. Put 
simply, the one consideration concerns what, exactly, to incorporate, and the other how, exactly, 
to integrate it. These are addressed in turn below. 
 
Fairness terminology (including the terms justice and equity) is employed with differing levels of 
specificity, both in theoretical work and in common usage, a fact that has been noted from 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics to modern social science research. That is, at times, it signifies 
the whole of goodness or virtue, including reciprocity, honesty, charity, etc., whereas, at other 
times, it represents values that are a proper subset of goodness. Hence, the question “What is 
fair?” is sometimes the same as the question “What is right?” or “What is good?” In other cases, 
it signifies something more specific, whereby there is survey evidence that the most specific 
sense of fairness is equivalent to accountability alone (Konow, 2001). We have chosen, in this 
paper, to define fairness in an intermediate sense as distributive preferences, partly because we 
believe this represents a close approximation of everyday usage of fairness terminology, which 
reflects a combination of general and specific meanings. But this implies that evidence on 
fairness preferences will give disproportionate weight to more specific meanings, like 
accountability. 
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To get an intuitive sense of this last claim, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose 
two workers, A and B, have the same ability, work equally hard, and produce the same amount 
of output. Which allocation, I or II, below is most fair? 
 
I.  A earns 100 USD per day, B also earns 100 USD per day 
II.  A earns 200 USD per day, B earns 150 USD per day 
 
Since both workers have contributed equally to output, allocation I seems fairer, consistent with 
the accountability principle, which calls for equal allocations in such a case. But consider instead 
the following question: Which allocation do you think should be implemented? Now allocation 
II seems a more acceptable response. Framed this way, the second question explicitly elicits 
more general moral preferences, and efficiency, therefore, receives increased weight in the 
respondent’s moral calculus. There is no inconsistency, therefore, in maintaining that I is fairer 
than II but that II is better than I. In the framework of both welfare economics and 
consequentialist ethics more generally, goodness can be the overarching goal, even if fairness is 
an element of goodness. Hence, it does not follow that, if people believe that Policy I is fairer 
than Policy II, society should prefer Policy I to Policy II. 
 
Thus, any attempt to incorporate moral preferences into a social objective function must first 
address the question of the level of specificity in those preferences. We advocate a very general 
approach that incorporates goodness in the broadest terms and believe that the burden of proof, 
in this matter, must fall on claims for a more narrow definition that excludes some moral 
preferences. Thus, we choose to treat fairness broadly as distributive justice here, since this 
encompasses many, if not most, moral preferences in this context. Nevertheless, in the interests 
of brevity and tractability, we have ignored other important moral preferences, such as 
reciprocity and honesty, that eventually might be included in a more general analysis. 
 
So, focusing on fairness as distributive justice, should this be incorporated into welfare analysis, 
and, if so, how? In addressing these questions, we proceed first from the most conservative 
conclusions implied from the foregoing analysis. The behavioral and survey evidence on fairness 
strongly suggests that people value it subjectively. That is, put into economic terms, people 
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derive utility (in terms of well-being) from fairness, or equivalently experience disutility from 
unfairness. If this is the case, fairness has implications for allocations even under standard 
analysis. 
 
Formally, we may think of a conventional welfaristic social welfare function as follows: 
( 1 2, ,..., nW w U U U= ) ,        (1) 
where  reflects the utility or well-being of individual i. Assume that each individual’s utility 
depends on his/her own income, 
iU
ix , as well as the perceived overall fairness, , so that iF
i∀
i∀
( , )i i i iU u x F= .          (2) 
Let us next assume that i’s perceived fairness depends on the distribution of income in the 
society generally, so that 
1( ) ( ,..., )i i i nF f f x x= ≡x .        (3) 
Note that if can reflect issues such as accountability, efficiency and need, and it is, therefore, not 
at all obvious that it is symmetric with respect to the income levels. For example, i may perceive 
the allocation to be fairer if individual 2 has twice the income of individual 1 relative to the case 
in which both have the same income. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) we obtain 
 .    (4) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2( , ( )), ( , ( )),..., ( , ( ))n n nW w u x f u x f u x f= x x x
We can next calculate the corresponding social marginal rate of substitution between an income 
change for individual i and j, as follows: 
( )
( )11 ,
ni i i k k k i
i
kij
j nj j j k k k j
k
w U u x u F f xdW dxSMRS i j
dW dx w U u x u F f x
=
=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = ∀
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∑
∑ .  (5) 
Thus, (5) reflects the social welfare increase of giving an additional dollar to individual i, relative 
to the welfare increase of instead giving the dollar to individual j. Clearly, this ratio depends on 
several components. First, it depends on the differences in the extent to which incremental utility 
contributes to social welfare. For example, a frequently made assumption is that w is utilitarian. 
In that case,  and (5) reduces to / /iw U w U∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ j
 1
1
,
ni i k k k i
ij k
nj j k k k j
k
u x u F f x
SMRS i j
u x u F f x
=
=
∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∑
∑ ∀  .    (6) 
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If w is not utilitarian, it is typically assumed that w is strictly quasi-concave, implying that the 
same utility increase raises welfare more the lower the initial utility level is. Next, there is a 
direct effect through the changes in utility levels. As we have specified the utility function very 
generally, we can, of course, not say anything in general about comparisons between i’s and j’s 
marginal utilities of income, but a commonly made assumption in applied work is that the 
marginal utility of income is decreasing in the income level. 
 
In addition to these welfare effects, we have the effects through the fairness perceptions. Note 
that we here have welfare effects for all individuals, since each individual’s fairness perception 
includes the incomes of i and j. The size of these welfare effects, in turn, depends on the weight 
the fairness concern carries in each individual’s utility function, k ku F∂ ∂ , as well as on how 
much each individual k’s fairness perception is affected by a small income increase of i (or j), 
i.e., on k if x∂ ∂ . Thus, even under very modest assumptions acceptable within standard welfare 
analysis, including utilitarianism, fairness has implications for social welfare. 
 
An alternative approach is to assume that fairness is an intrinsic argument in the social welfare 
function (SWF), as follows: 
( 1 2, ,..., ,nW w U U U F= )
i∀
)
.        (7) 
Note that (7) constitutes a non-welfaristic social welfare function, following the terminology of 
Sen (1970, 1979), since it does not solely depend on individual utilities. That is, people might 
think that the society should value fairness intrinsically. In this case, it can be shown that fairness 
matters for allocations, even if people individually do not derive utility from fairness. That is, let 
us here assume that people’s utilities (reflecting well-being) are not affected by any fairness 
concerns, so that we have 
( )i i iU u x= ,          (8) 
whereas the fairness concerns at the social level can be written as a social fairness function 
( )F f= x .          (9) 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) we obtain 
( 1 1 2 2( ), ( ),..., ( ), ( )n nW w u x u x u x f= x .      (10) 
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The social marginal rate of substitution between an income change for individual i and j can then 
be written as: 
,
i i i i
ij
j j j i
w U u x w F f xSMRS i j
w U u x w F f x
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∀
U
.    (11) 
Note that we cannot analyze a utilitarian case here, since utilitarianism is a special case of a 
welfaristic SWF, and the SWF in (7) is non-welfaristic. Nevertheless, we can still analyze the 
symmetric case in which each individual’s utility carries the same weight in the SWF, similar to 
the utilitarian case. Then, we have / / /i jw U w U w∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , implying that (11) simplifies 
to 
 ,
i i i
ij
j j j
w Fu x f x
w USMRS i jw Fu x f x
w U
∂ ∂∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂∂ ∂= ∂ ∂∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∀ .      (12) 
Ignoring the effects through the SWF, welfare effects emerge through the marginal utility of 
income, as above, and through the social fairness function. The size of the fairness related 
welfare effect depends on how much fairness is affected by the income change, if x∂ ∂ , and on 
the relative weight that is given on the margin to fairness concerns relative to utility concerns in 
the SWF, i.e., w F
w U
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ .  
 
We can, of course, also think of the case in which fairness is an argument both of individual 
utility functions and of the social welfare function. In this case, we can substitute (2), (3) and (9) 
into (7) and obtain 
( )1 1 1 2 2 2( , ( )), ( , ( )),..., ( , ( )), ( )n n nW w u x f u x f u x f f= x x x x .    (13) 
Then, we can write the social marginal rate of substitution between an income change for 
individual i and j as follows: 
( )
( )11 ,
ni i i k k k i i
kij
nj j j k k k j j
k
w U u x u F f x w F f x
SMRS i j
w U u x u F f x w F f x
=
=
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= ∀
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∑
∑ , (14) 
which, in the symmetric case where / / /i jw U w U w U∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , can be simplified as 
 24
 
1
1
,
ni i k k k i i
k
ij
nj j k k k j j
k
w Fu x u F f x f x
w USMRS i jw Fu x u F f x f x
w U
=
=
∂ ∂∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂∂ ∂= ∀∂ ∂∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∑
∑ .  (15) 
Thus, in addition to the welfare effects in (12), we have here also the effects through the 
individual fairness concerns in each individual’s utility function. 
 
Should the government respect people’s preferences in these respects? Starting with the effects 
through people’s utility functions, we find it hard to argue that these effects should not count. 
Indeed, why would utility derived from perceived fairness count less than the same amount 
derived for any other reason? 
 
The intrinsic fairness effect through the social objective function is perhaps less straightforward. 
But there are compelling reasons for basing social objective functions on the ethical values that 
people in the society have. By one view, this is justified as a representation of the moral 
preferences of an idealized agent. In fact, one can imagine a more radical departure from 
welfaristic social objective functions that abandons utility as an argument altogether. The social 
objective function might be written solely as a function of the various functions that, in turn, 
reflect moral preferences, including, inter alia, accountability, efficiency and need. The 
arguments of these moral preference functions could be income, as formulated above with the 
social fairness function, or utility could be reinstated by making the moral preference functions 
themselves functions of individual utilities. 
 
A related, but mostly separate, discussion has arisen regarding the implications of findings about 
bounded rationality for social welfare. A growing literature, motivated by behavioral economics 
insights, points out the hazards of adopting “consumer sovereignty” as a universal guiding rule 
for welfare analysis. One approach is to assume that what really matters is well-being rather than 
choice, following, for example, Broome (1999), Ng (1999), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and 
Johansson-Stenman (2008), or, using the terminology of Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) 
and Kahneman and Thaler (2004), to assume that what matters is experienced utility rather than 
decision utility. 
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In conventional welfare analysis, the ultimate goal is often expressed as the maximization of 
social welfare or well-being, and if we believe that respecting people’s preferences, as revealed 
by their choices, is an effective way of obtaining this goal, then it follows that it would indeed be 
a good idea for policy makers to respect the principle of consumer sovereignty. This is 
contingent, however, on the assumption that people do know, and act in accordance with, what is 
best (in terms of their well-being) for themselves. But suppose, for example, that people have 
self-control problems, which imply time inconsistency, such that they fail to act in accordance 
with their own interests. Then the link from consumer sovereignty to welfare maximization does 
not follow. 
 
As a result, policy measures based on different kinds of paternalism has been proposed. For 
example, Gruber and Köszegi (2002) argue in favor of cigarette taxation, not in order to 
internalize externalities (which they argue are rather small, anyway), but rather in order to 
internalize what they denote internalities, i.e., in order to help them act consistent with their own 
ultimate will and interest. Similarly, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) argue in favor of “fat taxes,” 
and other “sin taxes.” Camerer et al. (2003) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) provide good 
overviews of such arguments, whereas Sugden (2004) and Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009) 
provide alternative choice-based approaches when people make mistakes. 
 
Concerns for moral preferences and bounded rationality problems sometimes intersect. 
Bazerman refers to the phenomenon of “bounded ethicality,” i.e., the idea that even good people 
often violate moral norms unawares and as the result of ordinary and predictable psychological 
processes. For example, Gino and Bazerman (2009) find that people are more likely to accept 
unethical behavior when allowed to adapt to it more slowly. One can easily imagine serious 
ramifications of moral preferences under bounded rationality, e.g., if people express political 
preferences in favor of institutional arrangements that are perceived to be fair but that imply 
large inefficiency losses, which people systematically tend to underestimate. In fact, there is 
evidence of this, e.g., Caplan (2002) finds that people, on average, tend to underestimate the 
benefits from trade and globalization. The question then arises whether the social objective 
should be based on the values people express or rather on their “informed values.”  
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Thus, considerations of fairness and bounded rationality raise interesting, important and difficult 
challenges for welfare analysis. Nevertheless, these facts can be seen as a basis for improving 
and making more relevant this analysis. In the partial equilibrium context of cost-benefit 
analysis, that is precisely the conclusion at which Bazerman and Greene (2009) arrive, and we 
believe the same will be found to be true for general equilibrium welfare analysis. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents empirical evidence that people care about fairness and that it is possible to 
analyze fairness concerns systematically. Although views of fairness often differ, there is much 
less heterogeneity regarding impartial fairness concerns, i.e., those expressed by spectators. 
 
We conclude that fairness preferences have important implications for the field of environmental 
economics through the analysis of i) individual behavior, ii) the behavior of other decision 
makers such as policy makers and international negotiators, and also through iii) the overall 
social objective function. We believe that the benefits in terms of greater empirical predictive 
power, as well as greater theoretical and policy relevance, of incorporating fairness concerns in 
the analysis often dominate the associated costs in terms of greater complexity. We also believe 
that environmental economics would have greater influence on environmental policy if fairness 
considerations were taken more seriously. 
 
Thus, we think that theoretical and empirical research of fairness in environmental economics is 
fertile ground for future work. One particularly important and potentially impactful avenue of 
investigation is empirical analysis of fairness perceptions about alternative policy instruments. 
Many environmental policy instruments, such as tradable permit systems, can be quite complex 
and cognitively demanding for laypersons. This contextual complexity, often combined with the 
previously discussed self-serving biases, present challenges to reaching a consensus on 
environmental policy that is the result of an informed and thoughtful process. Thus, future work 
might build on experimental studies, such as those of Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992), which 
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engage people in discussions aimed at learning and moral reflection and which have sometimes 
been shown to generate consensus about policies with important distributive consequences. 
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